Introduction
When leaders of the now 70-year-old alliance met in the White House on April 26 of last year, the South Korean (ROK) public showed mixed takes on the issue. South Korean conservatives, traditionally supportive of the country’s alliance with the United States, unsurprisingly welcomed the summit meeting in general. The liberals and progressives, on the other hand, were more reserved and skeptical. The summit was held in the context of an increasingly assertive China, aggressive language from North Korea (DPRK), attempts of the incumbent South Korean president Yoon Suk-yeol to reinforce Korean ties with the US, and constant demands from hardcore Korean conservatives for South Korea to obtain its own nuclear arsenal.[i]
Amid such backdrop in US-ROK relations, the April Summit introduced the Washington Declaration, which not only reaffirmed the South Korean and American commitment to the alliance, but also outlined a vision for further cooperation within the bilateral alliance, particularly in nuclear issues.
The Declaration reaffirmed Korean “confidence in US extended deterrence commitments”[ii] and in “benefit of its enduring reliance on the US nuclear deterrent”.[iii] Notably, the Declaration made it clear that the ROK was “committed to its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty” (NPT). It also declared the establishment of a novel Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG). This intends to engage the ROK into the nuclear and strategic planning process of the US.
Experts convey mixed views. Hardliners such as Victor Cha of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) described the declaration as “the closest the alliance has come to a shared decision-making framework for the use of nuclear weapons in Korea”[iv]. The Economist noted that the “South Korean leader may yet turn more of his talk into action”, in relation to Korean reluctance to support Ukraine directly despite the Declaration, and that “South Korea worries about America’s reliability as an ally”, pointing to trust issues persistent within the US-ROK alliance as a backdrop of the Summit.[v] Likewise, some politicians in Korea, such as Yoo Seong-min, have expressed concern over the Declaration not being enough and merely rhetorical.[vi] This column attempts to evaluate the role and impact of the Washington Declaration in the US-ROK alliance from the lens of alliance theories, focusing on trust-building to answer the question: “Does the Washington Declaration build ROK trust in the US?” It will first cover theories including Glenn Snyder’s alliance theory and examine the role that the Washington Declaration plays in the alliance, from the perspective of both the US and South Korea.
Alliance Theories and Trust Building Among Nations
1. Alliance Theories
For insight on matters surrounding the US-ROK alliance, formalized in the form of a Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953 following the Korean War, it is useful to refer to generalized theories on how countries select alliances in international politics, as well as what dilemmas they face within the alliance. Various literature covers such dilemmas present in both the process of forming and maintaining alliances. The Origins of Alliances, written by Stephen M. Walt is widely known in this field. He argues that states tend to form alliances in order to balance against perceived threats to their national security. Threats, according to Walt, is a product of not only the power of the potential aggressor, but also the offensive intentions, offensive capabilities, and geographic proximity. These factors together largen the magnitude of perceived threat of states. When states perceive threat, they tend to balance against it. In other words, they “align against the source of the threat”, rather than bandwagoning, or “aligning with the source of threat”. As states typically want to increase their security at the least amount of autonomy being traded off within the alliance as a cost, they will choose to align with other countries against the potential aggressor; if they choose to bandwagon, they will end up becoming “reliant on the continued benevolence of the aggressor”.[vii] Security will come at a heavy price, trading off autonomy.
From the lens of Walt, one can think of the South Korea as having faced a choice in 1953, given the security threat coming from both China and North Korea, between aligning against them (“balancing”) by allying with the United States, or aligning with them (“bandwagoning”) for appeasement or interest. South Korea can be seen as having chosen the former.
2. Dilemmas within Alliances and Trust Building
The work of Glenn Snyder provides insight in what happens after states choose their alliances. Once states enter the internal politics of alliances, Snyder points out, “states move into the second phase of the alliance dilemma, in which their choices are no longer whether to ally or not, but how firmly to commit themselves to the proto-partner and how much support to give that partner in specific conflict interactions with the adversary”.[viii] He introduces the dilemma between “entrapment” and “abandonment” within alliance management. Entrapment is the risk inherent in alliance entry, in which a state is “dragged into a conflict” of an ally that it is not directly involved in.[ix] On the side of the country receiving help from an ally, they must worry about possible abandonment from the aid-providing ally. Minimizing these two risks pose a dilemma for states involved in an alliance. “Reducing one tends to increase the other”[x].
Snyder’s theory would likely suggest that the United States risked being entrapped in the Korean conflict when it became a formal ally of South Korea. Although not as apparent as the extra risk the US takes in terms of getting dragged into conflict, South Korea also puts itself at the risk of getting dragged into wars of the US. South Korean participation in the Iraq War can be seen as an example. For South Korea, however, the fear of US abandonment is far greater than entrapment into American conflicts. Any potential withdrawal of the American nuclear umbrella will eliminate the nuclear deterrence that South Korea has against the North and China. A withdrawal of US troops from the Korean peninsula would not only weaken conventional deterrence against adversaries, but also spark intense fear of immediate North Korean invasion. This fear, in part, is based on the perception held by many in South Korea (regardless of actuality) that the removal of the Korean Peninsula from the Acheson Line – the US defense line deterring Communist expansion – in January, 1950, was a contributing factor in North Korea’s decision to invade the South in June of that year.[xi]
One prominent dilemma provided by views like that of Snyder is a commitment problem in part of the participants in the alliance. That is, member states of a formal alliance, even when they have vowed to fight with the other member(s) in case of crisis, has incentives to deviate once conflict erupts. The US-ROK alliance is not an exception to such a dilemma. Combined with aforementioned fear of abandonment prevalent in the South Korean political discourse, it is imperative that South Korea be reassured of US commitment if it were to trust the US as an ally and also commit to the alliance as a strategy, rather than, say, pursue its own nuclear weapons or bandwagon with China and North Korea if such strategies are deemed as better for ROK survival.
One of such methods for the US, like many other countries in international politics, to earn its ally’s trust is sending a “costly signal” to South Korea. James D. Fearon proposes, “a threat may be rendered credible when the act of sending it incurs or creates some cost that the sender would be disincline to incur or create if he or she were in fact not willing to carry out the threat”.[xii] A credible threat must also “have some cost or risk attached to it that might discourage an unresolved state from making it”.[xiii] In other words, if a country makes an action seem costly enough that an uncommitted country wouldn’t act in such a way, it may be able to convince other states – whether they be adversaries it’s threatening or allies it’s trying to convince – that it is committed to the pledge they make. Increasing audience costs – a form of “tying hands” – is an example of how states can voluntarily make it more costly for them to back down from the pledge. From such a theoretical lens, the Washington Declaration can be viewed as a costly signal of the United States, signaling both its commitment to the US-ROK alliance so as to reassure South Korea, as well as its willingness to go to conflict – not avoiding the risk of entrapment – with North Korea in the event of an attack on the South, so as to deter such an attack by promoting its alliance commitment as credible. The following section discusses the function of the Declaration in sustaining the US-ROK alliance, including building trust by serving as a costly signal.
The Washington Declaration
1. Setting Boundaries
Based on the theoretical perspectives introduced, one can view the Washington Declaration in the context of efforts to sustain the US-ROK alliance. In particular, the Declaration can be interpreted as serving two major functions. The first is to set boundaries on the extent of South Korean pursuit of its own power. The second is reaffirming both American and Korean efforts to earn the other’s trust and serving as a costly signal to each country that the other is invested in the alliance, alleviating concerns from the public.
To begin with, the Washington Declaration, despite the lucrative and optimistic narrative implied, serves not only mutual affirmation of trust, but also as a clear brake on any South Korean ambition to acquire its own nuclear weapons, or a say in US nuclear strategies. That is, the Declaration makes it apparent that “[t]he ROK … recognizes the importance … of its enduring reliance on the U.S. nuclear deterrent”. Through the Declaration, President Yoon also “reaffirmed the ROK’s longstanding commitment to its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty”, “as well as to the U.S.-ROK Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy”.[xiv] The adherence to the existing Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea[xv], extended deterrence[xvi], the NPT[xvii], as well as the US-ROK Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation[xviii] together largely restricts Korea’s ability to pursue the development of its own nuclear armament.
Although the Declaration does enhance South Korean ability to take part in the nuclear planning of the US by means of a novel Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), President Biden maintained that he has “absolute authority, and sole authority, to launch a nuclear weapon”[xix], and the NCG may be understood as a substitute for South Korean pursuit of nuclear weapons. If anything, those in South Korea who were looking forward to Korea having a bigger say in nuclear strategy believe that the Declaration made South Korea “more dependent on the United States for its security”.[xx]
2. Reaffirming Effort
The Declaration, while explicitly limiting South Korea’s potential nuclear ambitions, still reaffirms US commitment to the alliance. Amid domestic worry and doubt of US willingness to back the ROK in the instance of a nuclear attack from the DPRK, the United States should find a way to alleviate such concerns and convince the Korean public of its commitment. This is especially true given North Korea’s ability to directly target US mainland, as well as American seeming inconsistency to commit to the alliance as shown during the Trump administration.[xxi] South Korean trust in American commitment had shaken during Trump’s presidency, as he “extorted payoffs from Seoul and regularly threatened to break the alliance”.[xxii] The Declaration itself, thus, can be seen as a form of costly signaling of US commitment to the US-ROK alliance. The NCG, “modeled after the NATO Nuclear Planning Group”[xxiii], is limited in its nature and restricts South Korean nuclear weapons to the confines of the Non-Proliferation regime, but it does have the effect of raising the withdrawal costs that would be endured by the US in a potential instance that it gets entrapped in a Korean conflict, at least compared to before the Declaration. In other words, South Korean involvement, and voice in nuclear planning of the US would, in the event of conflict, render American withdrawal from the alliance more difficult, not to mention the audience cost involved when a commitment is made so publicly.[xxiv]
The Declaration serves a similar purpose on the Korean end, as well. That is, the Declaration reassures Korean commitment to prefer a security strategy largely based on ties with the United States largely based on deterrence from conventional force, rather than pushing for nuclear autonomy. The NCG, in this light, provides an alternative to South Korea pursuing its own nuclear weapons rather than strengthening Korean nuclear autonomy. In theoretical terms, one may say that it reaffirms the ROK’s preference for external balancing, rather than internal balancing against security threats coming from the DPRK.
From the perspective of the Yoon administration specifically, it can serve as a starting ground and a signal of a much longer series of US-friendly foreign policies. Indeed, the administration did not stop at the Washington Declaration in strengthening ties with Washington last year. As an “enhanced visibility” measure of “strategic assets to bolster extended deterrence”, an American nuclear ballistic submarine (SSBN) nuclear submarine, the USS Kentucky, visited a South Korean port in July, the first such occasion since the early 1981.[xxv] In October, the B-52 strategic bomber flied over and landed in Korea.[xxvi] Importantly, President Yoon made a visit to Camp David in August to agree on a trilateral Joint Statemen with President Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida.
Conclusion
In all, US-ROK relations seems to have entered a phase last year in which the two countries are tested in their trust for one another. As we enter the third year of President Yoon’s administration, as well as a presidential election in the US, it will be imperative for Korean security for the allies to coordinate their foreign policies to devise effective measures to maintain stability on the Korean peninsula, at a time when stability seems to be a scarcity. With President Yoon adamant on external balancing – trusting American extended deterrence and increasing reliance on it – while America may be in for a second Trump administration, the task of the alliance in sustaining Korean security – as well as itself – will not be an easy one.
By Inseok Han
*** The views expressed herein belong solely to the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions of JTMS or Yonsei Institute for North Korean Studies. ***
[i] “Why South Korea is talking about getting its own nukes,” The Economist, January 19, 2023, https://www.economist.com/asia/2023/01/19/why-south-korea-is-talking-about-getting-its-own-nukes, accessed February 25, 2024.; “In a First, South Korea Declares Nuclear Weapons a Policy Option,” The New York Times, January 12, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/12/world/asia/south-korea-nuclear-weapons.html, accessed February 25, 2024.
[ii] “Washington Declaration,” The White House, April 26, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/26/washington-declaration-2/, accessed February 25, 2024.
[iii] Ibid.
[iv] Victor Cha, “An Assessment of President Yoon’s State Visit to the White House,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 1, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessment-president-yoons-state-visit-white-house, accessed February 25, 2024.
[v] “South Korea has America in its face and China breathing down its neck,” The Economist, April 24, 2023, https://www.economist.com/asia/2023/04/24/south-korea-has-america-in-its-face-and-china-breathing-down-its-neck, accessed February 25, 2024.
[vi] 조윤정, “한미정상회담 평가절하 유승민…”말의 성찬에 불과”,” 주간조선, May 3, 2023, https://weekly.chosun.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=26011, accessed February 25, 2024.
[vii] Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 17-49.
[viii] Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36(4) (1984), pp. 461-495.
[ix] Ibid., p.467.
[x] Ibid.
[xi] Ko Soo-suk, “Remember the Acheson Line,” Korea JoongAng Daily, January 1, 2018, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2018/01/01/fountain/Remember-the-Acheson-Line/3042765.html, accessed February 25, 2024.
[xii] James D. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 41(1) (1997), pp. 69-70.
[xiii] Ibid.
[xiv] Washington Declaration 2023, supra note 3.
[xv] “Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea; October 1, 1953,” Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kor001.asp, accessed February 25, 2024.
[xvi] Graham Allison, “Why Biden and Yoon’s Agreement Is a Big Deal,” Foreign Policy, April 27, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/27/biden-yoon-summit-nuclear-nonproliferation-us-south-korea/, accessed February 25, 2024; “Extended Deterrence,” Curtis E. Lemay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, December 18, 2020, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-72/3-72-D12-NUKE-OPS-Extended-Deterrence.pdf, accessed February 25, 2024.
[xvii] Graham Allison, “Why Biden and Yoon’s Agreement Is a Big Deal,” Foreign Policy, April 27, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/27/biden-yoon-summit-nuclear-nonproliferation-us-south-korea/, accessed February 25, 2024.
[xviii] “U.S.-Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation,” U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/remarks-and-releases-bureau-of-international-security-and-nonproliferation/u-s-republic-of-korea-r-o-k-agreement-for-peaceful-nuclear-cooperation/, accessed February 25, 2024.
[xix] Robert E. Kelly, “South Korea’s Nuclear Anxieties Haven’t Gone Away,” Foreign Policy, June 9, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/06/09/south-korea-nuclear-weapons-north-korea-washington-declaration/, accessed February 25, 2024.
[xx] Ibid.
[xxi] Ibid.
[xxii] Adam Mount and Toby Dalton, “America’s Ironclad Alliance With South Korea Is a Touch Rusty,” Foreign Policy, April 27, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/27/biden-yoon-summit-north-south-korea-nuclear-assurances/, accessed February 25, 2024; Scott A. Snyder, “The Washington Declaration: Expanding the Nuclear Dimension of the U.S.-South Korean Alliance Response,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 27, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/blog/washington-declaration-expanding-nuclear-dimension-us-south-korean-alliance-response, accessed February 25, 2024.
[xxiii] Byun Duk-kun, “S. Korea, U.S. to form nuclear consultative body amid N. Korea’s growing threats,” Yonhap News Agency, April 26, 2023, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230426001300325, accessed February 25, 2024; Scott A. Snyder, “The Washington Declaration: Expanding the Nuclear Dimension of the U.S.-South Korean Alliance Response,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 27, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/blog/washington-declaration-expanding-nuclear-dimension-us-south-korean-alliance-response, accessed February 25, 2024.
[xxiv] Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S. Sechser, “Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence,” American Journal of Political Science 58(4) (2014), p. 920.
[xxv] “Joint Press Statement on Nuclear Consultative Group Meeting,” The White House, December 16, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/12/16/joint-press-statement-on-nuclear-consultative-group-meeting/, accessed February 25, 2024; Victor Cha, “The U.S.-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group’s Successful Launching,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 20, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-rok-nuclear-consultative-groups-successful-launching, accessed February 25, 2024.
[xxvi] Ibid.
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