Introduction
Russia has been a security challenge for Japan since the 19th century. Hokkaido, the northernmost region of the Japanese archipelago and the second largest island after Honshu, has been a longstanding strategic stronghold in the nation's defense against Russia. The occupation of four islands of Hokkaido (the Northern Territories) by Russia（then the Soviet Union） has been a major source of contention between Japan and Russia since the Cold War era, hindering the conclusion of a peace treaty between the two nations. This issue was further complicated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and Japan’s participation in sanctions against the former along with the G7 nations. As a result, in March 2022, the Russian Foreign Ministry notified Japan of the termination of negotiations for a peace treaty.[i]
In response, Tokyo conducted a comprehensive review of its National Security Strategy (NSS) after a gap of nine years. The revised NSS, published in December 2022, acknowledged that Japan faced “the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII.”[ii] While the previous NSS identified North Korea and China as countries whose security trends should be closely monitored, the revised version now included China and North Korea in that order, with Russia added to the list.[iii]
Meanwhile, in recent years, the Japan Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) has been concentrating its efforts on the southwest in response to China’s escalating military activities. In the fall of 2021, as part of the JGSDF’s Exercise 21, the 2nd Division, stationed in Hokkaido, conducted mobile deployment exercises at the Hijudai Training Area in Oita Prefecture, western Japan, which is 2,000 km away.[iv]
Considering these developments, it is worthwhile to examine how the JGSDF perceives the threat from Russia. To this end, the author conducted an interview in November 2024 with a Lieutenant Colonel of the JGSDF who was familiar with Hokkaido’s defense, and who responded to the questions by stating that it was his personal opinion.
JGSDF Northern Army’s Perceptions of Russia
The Lieutenant Colonel began the interview by explaining the role of the Public Affairs Officer in the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF). In particular, he noted that with the spread of fake news and disinformation becoming the norm, public relations should not stop at press releases but must also be aware of the importance of communicating with society. This approach to public relations in the JSDF may also be behind the realization of the author's interview.
On the ramifications of the Sino-Russian alignment, The Lieutenant Colonel asserted that Russia’s substantial experiential background in actual warfare and the accumulation of space development technologies offered considerable insights for China. In this regard, he posited that Sino-Russian collaboration would enhance the former's operational capabilities and military technologies. Conversely, he acknowledged that Russia tends to resort more to military activities as a foreign policy instrument as compared to China.
The Officer then explained the current security situation around Hokkaido where Russia had converted the Sea of Okhotsk into a bastion for strategic ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBN), referring to Joseph Stalin's request to Harry Truman for northern Hokkaido at the end of World War II. He acknowledged that the geopolitical importance of northern Hokkaido to Russia remains unchanged, as the Soya Strait (La Pérouse Strait), located between the northernmost point of the island and Sakhalin Island, remains a critical geopolitical chokepoint connecting the Sea of Japan to the Sea of Okhotsk. Moreover, considering Russia’s ongoing deployment of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) assets, such as anti-ship missiles, in the Northern Territories as part of its efforts to turn the Sea of Okhotsk into a bastion,[v] he suggested it seems unlikely that it will return the Northern Territories to Japan in the near future, at least from a strategic geopolitical perspective.
Conversely, the JGSDF Northern Army, entrusted with the defense of Hokkaido, boasts of a personnel complement of 36,000, comprising of two divisions and two brigades, under its command. The Northern Army also maintains many training areas within the island, thereby underscoring its advantages in terms of both equipment and training. In the context of Cold War-era strategic planning, the most probable Russian invasion scenario of Hokkaido would have involved a landing in Wakkanai in the northernmost region. Addressing the inquiry about the persisting relevance of this invasion scenario, the Officer underscored the necessity to contemplate a wide range of potential scenarios, from a reconnaissance in force to a strategic landing invasion of Hokkaido.
Lessons from the war in Ukraine
The Lieutenant Colonel cited two strategic lessons from the Ukrainian War. The first was the impact of emerging technologies. He particularly pointed out that drones could be game changers in land warfare. The second was the importance of maintaining the ability to continue waging war. The importance of tanks as a trump card for territorial defense again became clear during the Ukrainian War. Considering these lessons, sections of the Japanese media reported in August 2024 that the nation’s Ministry of Defense had made the strategic decision to mothball the retiring Type 74 tanks in order to maintain the capacity to engage in continuous military operations.[vi]Despite being a second-generation main battle tank (MBT), the Type 74 tank can adapt to Japan’s topography and is very effective against infantry in combat.
In the interview with the Officer, the author again confirmed that the security environment surrounding Hokkaido was extremely serious. He said, “If we give the other side everything they want, including territory, there will probably be no war. However, if we do so, the other side will make endless demands.” This statement may be the most significant lesson for Japan from Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine.
Conclusion
We learned from the aforementioned interview as to how the JGSDF Northern Army, responsible for the defense of Hokkaido, perceived the threat from Russia. While strategic alignment between China and Russia could improve the former’s operational and space development capabilities in the long term, the latter tended to rely more on military force as a foreign policy tool compared to the former. Moreover, the geostrategic importance of northern Hokkaido to Russia has not changed since the end of World War II, and, in recent years, it has deployed A2/AD assets in the Northern Territories as part of its efforts to transform the Sea of Okhotsk into a bastion for its SSBNs. This suggests that the return of these territories to Japan is improbable in the near future.
The ongoing war in Ukraine has imparted several significant lessons, including the potential of emerging technologies, such as drones, to be game changers in future warfare. Additionally, the conflict has underscored the importance of maintaining the capacity to continue combat operations even during peacetime. The most important lesson from the war is that, though the likelihood of hostilities may be diminished by acquiescing to the demands of a hostile nation, such as the relinquishing of territory, it could result in the forfeiture of national sovereignty.
Acknowledgment: This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 21K01368.
By Dr. Shino Nagata (永田 伸吾)
Dr. Shingo Nagata is a visiting researcher at the Institute of Human and Social Sciences, Kanazawa University, Japan. He is also a member of the editorial board of the Japan Society of Strategic Studies (JSSS). His current research interests include the security of the Indo-Pacific region and around Japan.
*** The views expressed herein belong solely to the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the Journal of Maritime and Territorial Studies or Yonsei Institute for North Korean Studies. ***
[i] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Foreign Ministry Statement on Measures in Response to the Decisions of the Government of Japan,” 21 March 2022, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1805541/
[ii] The Government of Japan, National Security Strategy of Japan, December 2022, p. 2, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf
[iii] Ibid., pp. 8-10.
[iv] For more details on the JGSDF’s Exercise 21, see the following official footage on the website of the JGSDF. The Japan Ground Self Defense Force, “令和３年度陸上自衛隊演習,” 10 September 2021, https://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/news/train/2021/20210910.html
[v] Japan Ministry of Defense, “Development of Russian Armed Forces in the Vicinity of Japan,” September 2024, pp. 2-4, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/sec_env/pdf/ru_d-act.pdf
[vi] “防衛省が「74式戦車」保管へ 必要に応じ再利用 概算要求に7億円,” Mainichi Shimbun (毎日新聞), 30 August 2024, https://mainichi.jp/articles/20240830/k00/00m/040/179000c
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