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Yu Jeong Hwang

Houthis and Maritime Security: More Than Just Modern Piracy?

Photo Credit: The Insider

The Red Sea has long served as a critical waterway in the maritime domain. As a gateway to the Suez Canal, the Red Sea is the main supply route between Europe and Asia, accounting for around 30% of the world’s container traffic.[i]However, more than 200 times of Houthi attacks since October 2023[ii] have disrupted the global supply chain and international commerce in the Red Sea. In the first two months of 2024, trade through the Suez Canal decreased by 50 percent compared to the previous year[iii].


The Houthis, part of an Iranian-backed alliance known as the Axis of Resistance, have emerged as a growing threat to maritime security in the Middle East. They began targeting ships linked to Israel in mid-November 2023, purportedly in response to Israeli airstrikes on Gaza.


However, this is not the first time this key maritime route has been threatened. Notably, Somali pirates have disrupted the international supply chain for about 20 years in the Gulf of Aden. These pirates are notorious for hijacking vessels and extorting large ransoms in return for the release of hostages and seized ships. While Houthis and Somali pirates might seem similar at first glance, there are clear differences between the two groups regarding motivation and scale.

 

Are Houthis Pirates?

The question naturally arises: are the Houthis modern pirates? The short answer is no, and here's why. First and foremost, the Houthi attacks are not driven by economic gains. According to the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)[iv] Article 101, piracy involves illegal acts of violence or detention committed for private gain by the crew of a private ship or aircraft, typically outside the jurisdiction of any state. As stated in the famous interview with a Somali pirate, “We only want money,”[v] in contrast, their actions were straightforward: capture vessels, demand ransoms, and collect profits.


In stark contrast, the Houthis' attacks are politically driven. Their anti-shipping campaign targets both military and commercial vessels, specifically those tied to Israel, in a bid to pressure Israel into a ceasefire in Gaza. The increase in their attacks appears to be directly linked to the escalating tension between Iran and Israel in recent months. Unlike pirates who demand ransoms, the Houthis aim to sink or damage vessels without seeking any financial compensation. Additionally, the attacks bolster Houthis’ domestic influence[vi], as evidenced by increased recruitment in response to their support for Gaza.

 

Military Capabilities and Influence

Furthermore, the Houthis are much better armed than the Somali pirates. Employing ballistic and cruise missiles, long-range drones, underwater drones, and sea mines, Houthis show formidable attack capabilities. Their military strength largely comes from Iran, which provides them weapons, technology[vii], and tactical intelligence to Houthis[viii]. Despite Iran’s denial of involvement, the similarity between Houthi's anti-shipping campaign and Iran’s border-and-size naval commando tactics in early 2023[ix] suggests a strong link between the two. Many governments consider the Houthis to be a proxy for Iran, making them far more formidable than a simple pirate group.[x]

The United States Department of State has labeled the Houthis’ attacks as piracy[xi], but this label oversimplifies the situation. Framing the Houthis merely as pirates overlooks the broader political and military dynamics at play. Unlike Somali pirates, the Houthis function more as quasi-state actors, akin to Hezbollah, operating with direct ties to Iran. A military engagement with them could thus escalate into a broader regional conflict with Iran, adding layers of complexity to any international response.

 

Impact on Global Trade

Regardless of whether the Houthis are pirates or not, the fear of Houthis’ drone and missile attacks has already disrupted the international supply chains. Since last December, ship operators have rerouted vessels away from the Red Sea to sail around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope, using longer routes for crew safety, and the volume of container traffic through the Red Sea has decreased by around 80 percent[xii]. The detour increased travel time, fuel consumption, insurance premiums, and demand for private armed guards. Consequently, the cost of shipping a standard 40-foot container from Asia to northern Europe has risen sharply from less than 1,500 USD in mid-December to nearly 5,500 USD in January this year[xiii].


The rise in shipping costs affects consumers by raising the price of goods. Marion Jansen, Director of the Trade and Agricultural Directorate at the OECD, mentioned, "OECD estimates suggest that a doubling of global shipping costs, if persistent, would add 0.4 percentage points to consumer price inflation in OECD countries after about a year.”[xiv]Since the Red Sea and the Suez Canal handle 30 percent of international traffic for crude oil shipments[xv], the Houthis’ attacks could also potentially precipitate an energy crisis.

 

Restoring Maritime Stability: Global Efforts to Counter the Houthi Challenge

A multifaceted approach must be adopted, combining diplomacy, military strategy, and international cooperation to address the threat posed by the Houthis in the Red Sea. The international community has successfully combated piracy before—most notably in the case of Somali pirates. The success of operations such as the Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150)[xvi], NATO's Operation Ocean Shield[xvii], and the EU’s Operation Atalanta[xviii] demonstrates that sustained, coordinated international efforts can neutralize maritime threats. These missions combined intelligence sharing, naval patrols, and the use of legal frameworks to prosecute piracy, which significantly reduced piracy incidents in the Gulf of Aden by 2017.[xix]


Similarly, to counter the Houthis' increasingly sophisticated military capabilities, the international community could explore joint naval task forces with a focus on neutralizing threats in the Red Sea. These forces should be designed not just to deter attacks but also to secure shipping lanes, gather intelligence, and dismantle the networks supplying the Houthis with advanced weaponry. The critical difference, however, is that addressing the Houthi threat requires not just curbing criminal activities but also dealing with the geopolitical and military backing they receive from Iran.[xx]

Countries such as the United States (US) or European Union (EU) nations could lead efforts to develop targeted sanctions and diplomatic strategies aimed at reducing Iranian influence over the Houthis. This February, the US condemned Houthis “behaving like a terrorist organization”[xxi] and posed diverse sanctions targeting financing Houthis and Iran in the following months.[xxii][xxiii] Further, maritime states with vested interests in Red Sea security should initiate talks on establishing a broader, multinational maritime coalition aimed at protecting not only commercial shipping but also deterring the escalation of regional conflicts.


In conclusion, the Houthi threat to maritime security demands an international cooperation. However, it must acknowledge the political complexity of the region and the state-sponsored military power behind these attacks. While private shipping companies and insurers are coping with the current disruptions by adjusting routes and raising prices, it is ultimately up to governments and international bodies to take more definitive action. By drawing on past successes and adapting strategies to the unique challenges of the Houthis, the world can safeguard this critical maritime path and restore stability to global trade.


By Yu Jeong Hwang


*** The views expressed herein belong solely to the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the Journal of Maritime and Territorial Studies or Yonsei Institute for North Korean Studies. ***


[i] Spencer Feingold, “Red Sea attacks: What trade experts are saying about the shipping disruptions,” World Economic Forum, February 20, 2024, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2024/02/red-sea-attacks-trade-experts-houthi-shipping-yemen/, accessed on August 20, 2024.

[ii] “Yemen Situation Update: April 2024”, Yemen Conflict Observatory Monthly Report, ACLED, https://acleddata.com/2024/05/06/yemen-situation-update-april-2024/, accessed on August 20, 2024.

[iii] Parisa Kamali, Robin Koepke, Alessandra Sozzi, and Jasper Verschuur, “Red Sea Attacks Disrupt Global Trade”, IMF Blog, March 7, 2024, https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2024/03/07/Red-Sea-Attacks-Disrupt-Global-Trade, accessed on August 20, 2024.

[iv][iv] “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, December 10, 1982, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf, accessed August 20, 2024.

[v] Jeffrey Gettleman, “Somali Pirates Tell Their Side: They Want Only Money,” The New York Times, September 30, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/01/world/africa/01pirates.html, accessed on August 20, 2024

[vi] Al Jazeera, “Who are the Houthis? A Simple guide to the Yemeni Group,” Al Jazeera, January 12, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/12/who-are-yemens-houthis-a-basic-guide, accessed on August 20, 2024.

[vii] Christian Edwards, “Who are the Houthis and why are they attacking ships in the Red Sea?,” CNN, February 4, 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/19/middleeast/red-sea-crisis-explainer-houthi-yemen-israel-intl/index.html, accessed on August 20, 2024.

[viii] Andrew England, “Who are the Houthis?,” Financial Times, January 10, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/8e9eb52c-cf78-4052-8c28-2c2cef8f9372, accessed on August 20, 2024.

[ix] Michael Knights, “Assessing the Houthi War Effort Since October 2023,” CTC Sentinel, Washington Institute, April 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Knights20240430-CTCSentinel.pdf, accessed on August 20, 2024.

[x] International Affairs and Defence Section, “UK and International response to Houthis in the Red Sea 2024,” Research Briefing, UK Parliament, July 30, 2024, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9930/, accessed on August 20, 2024.

[xi] Matthew Miller, “Houthi Attacks on International Shipping,” Press Statement, U.S. Department of State, February 21, 2024, https://www.state.gov/houthi-attacks-on-international-shipping/, accessed on August 20, 2024.

[xii] Al Jazeera, “Mapping the Red Sea attacks: How Houthi attacks on one of the world’s main maritime trade routes have impacted international trade,” Al Jazeera, https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2024/mapping-red-sea-shipping-attacks/, accessed on August 20, 2024.

[xiii] Paul Wiseman and Mae Anderson, “Attacks on ships in the Red Sea are disrupting global trade. Here’s how it could affect what you buy,” AP News, January 28, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/red-sea-houthi-attacks-shipping-inflation-124d5445bec8ce6864112e3095646308, accessed on August 20, 2024.

[xiv] Feingold, 2024

[xv] Broekman Logistics, “How Yemen’s Houthi attacks in the Red Sea are affecting cargo prices and delivery times,” Broekman Logistics, https://www.broekmanlogistics.com/insight/how-yemens-houthi-attacks-in-the-red-sea-are-affecting-cargo-prices-and-delivery-times/, accessed on August 20, 2024.

[xvi] Combined Maritime Forces, “CTF 150: Maritime Security,” https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-150-maritime-security/, accessed on August 27, 2024.

[xvii] NATO, “Counter-piracy operations (2008-2016),” May 19, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48815.htm, access on August 27, 2024.

[xviii] EU Naval Force Operation ATLANTA, https://eunavfor.eu/, accessed on August 27, 2024.

[xix] Peter V. Jakobsen, “Somali piracy, once an unsolvable security threat, has almost completely stopped. Here’s why,” The Conversation, September 27, 2023, https://theconversation.com/somali-piracy-once-an-unsolvable-security-threat-has-almost-completely-stopped-heres-why-213872, accessed on August 27, 2024.

[xx] Jakobsen, 2023

[xxi] Matthew Miller, “Houthi Attacks on International Shipping,” Press Statement, U.S. Department of State, February 21, 2024, https://www.state.gov/houthi-attacks-on-international-shipping/, accessed on August 27, 2024.

[xxii] Vedant Patel, “Sanctions Targeting Houthi and Hizballah Networks,” Press Statement, U.S. Department of State, August 15, 2024, https://www.state.gov/sanctions-targeting-houthi-and-hizballah-networks/, accessed on August 27, 2024.

[xxiii] Kate Winston, “US Treasury imposes new sanctions targeting financing for Houthi rebels,” S&P Global, July 18, 2024, https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/071824-us-treasury-imposes-new-sanctions-targeting-financing-for-houthi-rebels, accessed on August 27, 2024.

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