Great Power Competition in the Arctic & Greenland’s Geostrategic Importance

Kulusuk Village, East Greenland. Photo provided by Pixabay.com

Introduction

The world’s great power states are gearing up for the cold as they set their sight on the polar North. The Arctic region is quickly becoming a potential economic frontier as rising temperatures are causing the melting of ice and thawing of the land. This new ‘scramble for the Arctic’ brings opportunity for international cooperation, but also the risk of great power competition entangled with security concerns. With Russia updating its Arctic foreign policy objectives in April of 2023 and China declaring itself a “Near-Arctic State” in its 2018 white paper, the United States has also adjusted its policies towards this fast-changing region.[i]

In the 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, an American report, states a “peaceful, stable, prosperous, and cooperative” Arctic is the vision for the region in the next decade.[ii] However, the report also acknowledges the Arctic’s increased importance and therefore the potential competition and security risks involved as activity in the region grows. Russia and China’s increased activities in the Arctic region are specifically mentioned as key areas to be monitored and deterred. Therefore, the U.S. also intends to increase its polar presence through research opportunities, military enhancements, and by participating in regular and transparent joint drills with NATO allies. Such actions will support “homeland defense, global military and power projection, and deterrence goals” as the protection of the American people, treaty allies, and the U.S. sovereign territory and rights remains America’s top priority.[iii]

         Not only are the great powers aware of the changes in the Arctic but also smaller states in the region as well. One state, in particular, that finds itself in the middle of these complex geopolitical changes and key to great power Arctic strategies is Greenland. Greenland, an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark and home to 56,000 people is located almost entirely within the Arctic Circle. In June of 2009, the Act on Greenland Self-Government was enacted that passed certain responsibilities from Denmark to Greenland such as the right to manage its natural resources; however, the following fields remain in Denmark’s jurisdiction: “the Constitution; nationality; the Supreme Court; foreign, defence and security policy as well as exchange rate and monetary policy.”[1] The world’s largest island now finds itself with the challenge of taking advantage of its new strategic position for economic opportunities but also managing the security risks that come with the increased activity in the Arctic.

         In this new geopolitical arena marked by environmental changes that are presenting new economic, military, and power projection opportunities, great power states are actively pursuing their Arctic ambitions. The initial hopes for the Arctic is that it would be a place of cooperation and shared benefits, even amongst the great powers, however, with Russia’s war on Ukraine and China’s continued disregard for international laws in the South China Sea, chances of cooperation are getting bleaker and competition more probable. As such, the geostrategic importance of Greenland in U.S. efforts to counter great power states is becoming more evident as the U.S. strives to balance Russian remilitarization of the region and block Chinese influence efforts.

         This paper will begin by introducing ‘geopolitics’ and ‘geostrategic’ as complex terms commonly used to explain the current international dynamics in the polar region through a realist theoretical approach that explains great power competition in the region as security risks need to be considered. Next, Greenland’s geostrategic importance is not new and its past role in great power rivalries is relevant for understating contemporary times. Russia and China will be introduced individually, given their distinct Arctic goals and approaches to achieving them and how the U.S. intends to use Greenland to counter its competition. Lastly, some considerations are presented as the U.S. and Denmark navigate Greenland's unique status as an autonomous entity aspiring for independence and its future relations with the West.

Literature & Theory

While scholars have sought to understand the connection between geography, politics, and international relation for as far back in history as maps have been drawn, it was not until the late 19th century that a name was given to this field of study. Swedish political scientist, Rudolf Kjellén, coined the terms ‘geopolitics’ and ‘geostrategic’ in 1899 and in 1905 by combining ‘geo’ in geography with ‘politics and ‘strategy’ to emphasize how geographical features shape the political and strategic military decisions of states.[2] For over a century the terms have been used in hundreds of different ways influencing scholars and military strategists, however, still no commonly recognized definition has been set. There are however geopolitical theorists, like Sir Halford J. Mackinder whose work has shaped the policies and strategies of international affairs. Mackinder’s famous ‘Heartland Theory’ (1904, 1919, and 1943) emphasizes the Eurasian heartland as the pivotal center of the world and the key to achieving domination.[3] Liu (2016) uses Mackinder’s ‘Heartland Theory’ to understand contemporary great power Arctic relations stating that “whoever controls the Arctic region will be able to attain commanding heights in the world’s military affairs” and bolster a state’s capabilities and prestige.[4]

         Other geopolitical scholars, like the Sprouts (1960), draw attention to geographical changes caused by human influences and new technology, as well as shifts in the environment.[5] These changes then give new meaning to geographical features like location, climate, and natural resources which can affect political, military, and economic relations.[6] Relative to the Sprouts, Mackinder (1890) explains the course of politics as being guided by “economic wants and geographical opportunities” as state actors, in turn, recognize the power of these forces.[7] This thinking aligns with realist theory where the international system is characterized as anarch and states and their actors’ activity seek ways to achieve their interest and obtain power.[8] These core realist ideas can explain great power state’s pursuit of the Arctic as the region is seen as strategically valuable to achieve their power-seeking goals.

         Realist theory, which historically has been tied to the concept of security, where the possession and deployment of military capabilities corresponds with the pursuit of power, has been expanded by influential security scholars like Barry Buzan. Buzan (1983) has moved security discourse past the classical understandings of just military and politics by encompassing economic and environmental dimensions, and as indicated above, these are inseparable from their geographical features which are prone to changes.[9] Today, one of the greatest challenges the world faces is climate change, and although its effects are vast and far-reaching all around the globe, it is in the Arctic where its effects are experienced the greatest. As a result, Greenland is in the middle of these changes as this polar island has now assumed new geopolitical and geostrategic importance as great power states compete to achieve their Arctic and power-seeking goals.

Historical Role

When U.S. President Donald Trump made an offer to buy the island of Greenland from Denmark in August of 2019, many did not take him seriously, but it is worth noting that this is not the first time the United States has contemplated purchasing the world’s largest island. Considerations to purchase Greenland go back as far as: in1867 when the US negotiated the purchase of Alaska from the Russian Empire;[10] in 1910, the U.S. Ambassador to Denmark, contemplated proposing a deal;[11] and by 1946 the U.S. had made an official offer to buy Greenland with $100 million in gold to which it was denied.[12] Evidently, the U.S. has for a long time recognized the geostrategic importance of Greenland. Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) argued that geography determines the course of history and in the case of Greenland, the island’s past holds historical geographical significance even before climate change became a popular discussion as it has long separated America from its enemies.[13]

During the Second World War and into the Cold War era, Greenland’s location was key to its role in global affairs. While Denmark was occupied by Nazi Germany in 1940, leaving Greenland isolated and exposed, the U.S. in 1941 established air and weather stations on the island which were key to supporting the air force.[14] Then, during the Cold War, Greenland’s location was further utilized for the Thule Air Base, built in 1951, to act as an early warning and defence system against potential Soviet missile attacks.[15] Although Greenland’s military use has decreased since the Cold War ended, as all but the Thule Air Base remains active, this is likely to change as the Arctic braces for the present-day great power angst. Thus, Greenland is yet again geostrategic-ally important to the U.S.

Russia: Restoring its Place

         Greenland, is geographically situated between the United States and its Russian rival, and the island is once again expected to play a strategic role in the U.S.’s efforts to counter Russia’s advances. Although Russia is not specifically interested in Greenland, it has over the last decade sought to restore its place in the world as a global power choosing to focus on its Arctic coastline as new opportunities are presented as a result of the changing climate. The Arctic region is crucial to Russia as it has long provided a front to showcase its economic prowess and military strength.

         Economically, the majority of Russia’s resources and natural gas reserves are located in the Arctic and Moscow has made its intentions clear that it will defend its interests, including its plan to dominate the emerging Northern Sea Route (NSR).[16] With the world’s largest fleet of conventional and nuclear-powered icebreakers, Russia has the ability to do so and therefore poses a threat to America’s long-held principle, freedom of the seas.[17]  Additionally, Russia has been expanding its military operation into the Barents and Greenland Sea while reportedly sending submarines into the GIUK Gap (the naval choke point between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom), which is essential in NATO defense and deterrence strategies while also being lined with transatlantic cables on the seabed.[18] The U.S. has been increasing its naval presence in the region but it has become evident that America is not the dominant superpower in the North as it lacks adequate equipment, such as icebreakers, needed for the harsh polar environment.[19] Thus, the U.S. considers its NATO Polar Allies as vital assets and Greenland a much needed base in the Polar Northern Atlantic and Arctic Ocean.

         As mentioned, Russia’s economic and seaward ambitions are not the only perceived threat the U.S. is monitoring. The Russian Northern coastline is home to the majority of key Russian military sites such as air and naval bases, dual-use facilities, and nuclear stockpiles, and part of Russia’s remilitarization of the territory has been to refurbish these sites.[20]One base in particular that has the U.S. seeking to negotiate greater military presence in Greenland has been the renovations of the Nagurskoye Air Base, located the closest to Greenland.[21] “Russian fighter jets, refueling in the air, could potentially reach Thule Air Base from Nagurskoye much faster than previously” and today, Thule continues to be central to U.S. homeland security.[22] Thule Air Base plays a fundamental strategic role in tracking potential Russian air and naval operations, along with acting as the first line of defense against potential incoming missiles from Russia, China, and even North Korea.[23] Plans to refurbish Thule are in the works with the U.S. Department of Defense informing of a $3.95 billion USD maintenance contract.[24] Because of Russia’s assertive beahviour and remilitarization of the Arctic, the U.S. is reassessing its strategic partnership with Greenland as the island is increasingly becoming more important against Russian aggression and potentially acting as a base should the U.S. ever need to more greatly remilitarize the region.[25]

China: Asserting its Influence

China has always sought to expand its influence in regions it deems strategically advantageous and therefore has turned its attention North as outlined in its 2018 Arctic Policy. China, designating itself as a “Near-Arctic State,” calls for “peace, stability, and sustainable development in the Arctic” while prioritizing mutually beneficial outcomes China calls the “win-win result” value.[26] The white paper outlines China’s plans to partake in scientific research, shipping routes, resource exploration, and other relevant fields in the polar region. The foundation for China’s Arctic strategy is to expand its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to include a “Polar Silk Road” that will foster economic development in the region and secure China’s role in Arctic affairs.[27] However, unlike Russia, Greenland has a specific role to play in China’s Arctic ambitions due to its abundance of natural resources, openness to international investments, and relevance to scientific research, making the island the perfect target for China to propagate its influence.

China has attempted to take part in several projects in Greenland that have raised security concerns for Denmark and the U.S.. The Kvanefjeld mine is one such project that has been caught in controversy as Greenland Minerals, a majority Chinese-owned Australian mining company has targeted the mine’s rare-earth resources, leading to lengthy debate due to the uranium present in the mine.[28] Additionally, the Greenlandic government’s approval of a Chinese company’s bid to build three airports was met with immediate alarm. If China were to ever gain control of the runways and operate warplanes on the island, this would pose a direct security risk to Denmark and the U.S..[29] After pressure from the U.S. government, Denmark is now responsible for financing the construction of the airports.[30] Lastly, the integrity of China’s research institutes in the Arctic have been called into question. In the 2019 annual Intelligence Risk Assessment report by the Danish Defence Intelligence Service, China’s research facilities are recognized as the country’s method to place itself in the Arctic and with ‘dual-purpose’ military operations.[31] The U.S.’s own Arctic policy paper states, “Over the last decade, the PRC [the Peoples Republic of China] has doubled its investments …expanded its scientific activities; and used these scientific engagements to conduct dual-use research with intelligence or military applications in the Arctic.”[32] A notable example is China’s plans to build a satellite ground station in Greenland’s capital, Nuuk, for its BeiDou-System (a GPS equivalent). This system would allow better Chinese navigation in the Arctic and raises security concerns due to the potential of providing more accurate drone and missile positioning and timing for the Chinese military.[33]

The United States, in its attempt to limit China’s access to the Arctic, and to Greenland, has been slowly increasing its presence on the island. In June 2020, the U.S. reopened its Consulate in Nuuk which will help counter China’s influence with stronger American influence of its own, creating a direct line of communication between Washington and Nuuk.[34] Already the new Consulate has been able to more smoothly negotiate and plan projects, such as future renewable energy and mineral resource projects.[35] A more recent development is the establishment of a new economic aid package that will help support Greenland’s resource, tourism, and education sectors, and more significantly, U.S. military presence on Greenland.[36] Given Greenland’s renewed strategic importance, the U.S. recognizes the Arctic as a geopolitical arena for growing great power competition and consequently, Greenland’s vulnerability. Particularly, as China seeks a threshold in Greenland, the U.S. understands more greatly the risk Chinese presence on the island poses to American homeland security.

Considerations & Conclusion

         As the Arctic region changes and attracts greater attention, Greenland finds itself with revived geostrategic importance. The United States striving to move forward with its geostrategic interest in Greenland must remember to consider the unique relationship between Copenhagen and Nuuk and the desires of the Greenlandic government and its people. Due to the Self-Government Act, Denmark tries to reaffirm its commitment towards Greenland’s eventual independence, whilst navigating demands from Washington and “trying to avoid antagonizing China and Russia” hoping to prevent escalation in the region.[37] The U.S., though looking to counter Russia’s military growth and China’s quest for Arctic influence, must also be careful not to overstep its own ambitions in Greenland and the region.

         Although Greenland’s unique situation offers an opportunity for America to influence and shape Nuuk, it does not mean good relations are certain in the future. Greenland has already shown its willingness to partner with non-Western states to secure its economic interests. Therefore, if U.S.-Greenland-Denmark relations were to ever deviate, Russia and China would immediately take the opportunity to utilize Greenland’s strategic position.[38] For now, relations are stable as Greenland’s current Prime Minister, Mute B. Egede, intends to prioritize relations with the U.S. as “Greenland’s most important strategic partner.”[39]

         The emerging geopolitical arena in the Arctic is presenting opportunities for great power states to assert their influence and pursue greater power. As a result, Greenland maintains crucial geostrategic importance in America’s plan to navigate these changes and pursue its own Arctic ambitions. After playing a strategic role during the Second World War and the Cold War, Greenland’s importance to U.S. strategy is revived once again. While Russia asserts its claims to the NSR and its potential resources, coupled with rapid remilitarization of its Northern facilities, Greenland remains vital to U.S. mainland security. The Thule Air Base in Greenland is expected to continue playing a strategic base for America both in the air and at sea. In addition, the island provides for easier coordination between the U.S. and its Polar NATO Allies.

         Moreover, China’s strategy to assert itself as an Arctic power includes access to Greenland. Targeting the island’s rare-earth material and participating in infrastructure projects, China wants influence and undisputed access to the Arctic. In addition, the integrity of China’s ongoing Arctic research ventures remains monitored. The U.S. will continue using its diplomatic and military presence on Greenland to block China and coordinate with Denmark to ensure potential economic and military security threats are managed. However, as long as climate change continues to alter the region, resources are desired, and political feuds remain within the international community, Greenland’s geopolitical relevance is inescapable and the island may just find itself needing to choose who it wants to be stuck with in the melting ice.

By Nina Schinacriol

*** The views expressed herein belong solely to the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions of JTMS or Yonsei Institute for North Korean Studies. ***

[1] "Greenland," Prime Minister's Office, The Unity of the Realm, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed November 23, 2023, https://english.stm.dk/the-prime-ministers-office/the-unity-of-the-realm/greenland/#:~:text=The%20Self%2DGovernment%20Act%20provides,law%2C%20accounting%20and%20auditing%3B%20mineral.

[2] A. B. Elatskov, "Generalized Types of Geopolitical Models," Geography and Natural Resources 40, no. 3 (2019): 215–20, https://doi.org/10.1134/s187537281903003x, 215.

[3] H. J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” The Geographical Journal 23, no. 4 (1904): 421–37, https://doi.org/10.2307/1775498; and H. J. Mackinder, Democratic ideals and Reality: A study in the politics of Reconstruction, Suffolk: Penguin Books, 1919; and H. J. Mackinder, “The Round World and the Winning of the Peace,” Foreign Affairs 21, no. 4 (1943): 595–605, https://doi.org/10.2307/20029780.

[4] H. R. Liu, "Yidaiyulu zhanlue Beijingxia de Beijihangdao kaifaliyong [The development of the Northern Sea Route under the Belt and Road strategy]," Zhongguo Gongcheng Kexue, 2016, no. 2: 111–118. As cited in Chih Yuan Woon, “Framing the ‘Polar Silk Road’ (bing shang sichouzhilu): Critical Geopolitics, Chinese Scholars and the (Re)Positionings of China’s Arctic Interests,” Political Geography 78 (2020): 102141, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.102141, 5.

[5] Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, “Geography and International Politics in an Era of Revolutionary Change,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 4, no. 1 (1960): 145–61, http://www.jstor.org/stable/172590, 145.

[6] Ibid., 145.  

[7] H. J. Mackinder, "The Physical Basis of Political Geography," Scottish Geographical Magazine 6, no. 2 (1890): 78-84, DOI: 10.1080/14702549008554692, 84.

[8] Ibid., 84.

[9] Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations, 2nd ed. (Wheatsheaf Books, 1983).

[10] Brainerd Dyer, “Robert J. Walker on Acquiring Greenland and Iceland,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 27, no. 2 (1940): 263–66, https://doi.org/10.2307/1896815, 263-264.

[11] U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, with the Address of the President to Congress December 4, 1917," Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1917 Supplement, Volume 1, Document 759, Accessed November 23, 2023, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1917/d759.

[12] Matthias Heymann, et al., "Small State versus Superpower," in Cold War Science and the Transatlantic Circulation of Knowledge, ed. Jeroen van Dongen (Brill, 2015), History of Modern Science series, ISBN 978-90-04-26422-9, 251.

[13] Geoffrey Sloan and Colin S. Gray, “Why Geopolitics?” Journal of Strategic Studies 22, no. 2–3 (1999): 1–11, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402399908437751, 4.

[14] Jenna Biter, “The US Military in Greenland, America’s Defense Bastion in the High North,” Coffee or Die Magazine, June 23, 2023, https://coffeeordie.com/us-military-greenland. Accessed December 9, 2023.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Shireen Mushtaq, Uswa Sharif, and Rida Fatima, “Strategic Opportunity, Security Dilemma and the Interplay of Interests: Russia, China and the US in the Arctic Region since 2014,” Margalla Papers 27, no. 1 (2023): 67–81, https://doi.org/10.54690/margallapapers.27.1.152, 74.

[17] Ibid., 76-77.

[18] Martin Breum, "How a Dispute over China and Greenland’s Airports Worked Its Way toward a Solution," ArcticToday, June 30, 2018, https://www.arctictoday.com/dispute-china-greenlands-airports-worked-way-toward-solution/.

[19] David Larter, "The US Navy Returns to an Increasingly Militarized Arctic," Defense News, August 18, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/05/11/the-us-navy-returns-to-an-increasingly-militarized-arctic/.

[20] Mushtaq, Sharif, and Fatima, "Strategic Opportunity," 67.

[21] Martin Breum, "US, Greenland Reach Agreement on Thule Air Base Contract, Long a Source of Dispute," ArcticToday, October 29, 2020, https://www.arctictoday.com/us-greenland-reach-agreement-on-thule-air-base-contract-long-a-source-of-dispute/.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Margrét Cela and Pia Hansson, "Geopolitics and Neglected Arctic Spaces: Three Northern Perspectives on Balancing External Interests," Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2020, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26993, 6.

[24] Hilde-Gunn Bye, "USA Awards New Contract for Thule Air Base, Reverting Back to Greenlandic Control," High North News, December 19, 2022, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/usa-awards-new-contract-thule-air-base-reverting-back-greenlandic-control.

[25] Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, "Structural, Environmental, and Political Conditions," in Barry Scott Zellen, ed., The Fast-Changing Arctic: Rethinking Arctic Security for a Warmer World (University of Calgary Press, Calgary, Alberta, 2013), http://hdl.handle.net/1880/49680, 177.

[26] People’s Republic of China, “China’s Arctic Policy.”

[27] Chih Yuan Woon, “Framing the ‘Polar Silk Road’ (bing shang sichouzhilu): Critical Geopolitics, Chinese Scholars and the (Re)Positionings of China’s Arctic Interests,” Political Geography 78 (2020): 102141, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.102141, 1.

[28] Martin Breum, “Chinese-Linked Australian Mining Company Sues Greenland for $11bn Over Lost Revenue,” ArcticToday, October 11, 2023, https://www.arctictoday.com/chinese-linked-australian-mining-company-sues-greenland-for-billions-of-usd-over-lost-revenue/#:~:text=Chinese%20mining%20corporation%20Shenge%20Resources,of%20the%20proposed%20Kuannersuit%20mine.

[29] Drew Hinshaw and Jeremy Page, "How the Pentagon Countered China’s Designs on Greenland," The Wall Street Journal, February 10, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-the-pentagon-countered-chinas-designs-on-greenland-11549812296.

[30] Charles E. Morrison and Mark Nuttall, "New U.S. Policies toward Greenland," East-West Center, 2019, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24981, 3.

[31] Danish Defence Intelligence Service, Intelligence Risk Assessment 2019, Copenhagen, November 20 2019,https://www.fe-ddis.dk/globalassets/fe/dokumenter/2020/risk-assessments/-risk_assessment2019-.pdf, 17.

[32] The White House, National Strategy for Arctic Region, 6.

[33] Martin Breum, “China and the US Both Have Strategic Designs for Greenland” ArcticToday, October 17, 2018, https://www.arctictoday.com/china-us-strategic-designs-greenland/; and Anne-Marie Brady, “Facing up to China’s Military Interests in the Arctic,” Jamestown, December 10, 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/facing-up-to-chinas-military-interests-in-the-arctic/.

[34] Mushtaq, Sharif, and Fatima, "Strategic Opportunity," 77.

[35] Sung W. Choi, "Setting up a U.S. Consulate in Greenland, Again," The Polar Connection, June 9, 2021, accessed at https://polarconnection.org/us-consulate-greenland-sung-choi/.

[36] Jacob Gronholt-Pedersen and Stella Qiu, "China Withdraws Bid for Greenland Airport Projects: Sermitsiaq Newspaper," edited by Louise Heavens, Reuters, June 4, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-silkroad-greenland-idUSKCN1T5191/.

[37] Cela and Hansson, "Geopolitics and Neglected Arctic Spaces," 6.

[38] Barry Scott Zellen, "U.S. Defence Policy and the North," In Zellen, The Fast-Changing Arctic, 238.

[39] Melody Schreiber, "Greenland PM Calls for Closer US Ties in Washington Visit," ArcticToday, June 16, 2022, https://www.arctictoday.com/greenland-pm-calls-for-closer-us-ties-in-washington-visit/.

[i] The Russian Federation, “The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, n.229, March 2023, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/fundamental_documents/1860586/; and People’s Republic of China, “China’s Arctic Policy,” State Council Information Office, January 2018, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm.

[ii] The White House, National Strategy for Arctic Region (Washington, DC: White House, October 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf, 3.

[iii] Ibid., 8-9.