Introduction
In 2020, the Shiprider Agreement faced scrutiny when the US Coast Guard detained the crew of a Jamaican fishing vessel on suspicion of drug trafficking. Despite subsequent dismissal of charges, concerns arose about the impact of such incidents on Jamaican sovereignty.
The archipelagic state of Jamaica is perfectly positioned in the Americas to be a transit point for drugs from South America to North America and Europe. The long-standing economic cooperation between Jamaica and the US spilled over into security cooperation in countertrafficking. The aim of anti-narcotic security cooperation is for self-interest of each state and to tackle drug trafficking.[i] Counterdrug trafficking cooperation between Jamaica and the US commenced in 1974 with Operation Buccaneer, Operation Prop Lock in 1995, and Operation Frontier in 1999.[ii] The Shiprider Agreement is a counterdrug cooperation treaty between Jamaica and the US and is described as an important milestone because each state is unable to unilaterally tackle this issue. Without this agreement Jamaica does not have the resources to adequately police its waters and airspace and the US would not have legal authority to enter the maritime space and airspace of Jamaica. As such, drug trafficking would not be hampered.
The aim of this analysis is to determine if the increase in security outweighs the decrease in autonomy, aiming to understand its implications on Jamaica's sovereignty. Or in other words, to examine whether the benefits derived from increased security surpass the costs associated with decreased autonomy under the Shiprider Agreement.
Understanding Sovereignty and Security
Security cannot exist without sovereignty and sovereignty cannot exist without security. This statement encapsulates the fundamental principle in the field of international relations, emphasizing the interconnectedness and mutual dependence of security and sovereignty. Security is often referred to as an essentially contested concept. This means that there are numerous interpretations of security by scholars, and they have not agreed on a definition of security. Nevertheless, security can be defined as used is pursuits of freedom from threats.[iii]. Generally speaking, security refers to the protection of a state's territory, population, and interests from various threats, including military aggression, terrorism, cyberattacks, etc. Security can be analyzed based on it’s the mechanism it used to guarantee the pursuits of freedom from threats. First, security can be thought of as prevention defined as the absence of a threat.[iv] Secondly, it can be conceptualized as deterrence defined as the suspension of a threat.[v] Finally, security can be defined as protection which refers to as the survival of a threat.[vi]
On the other had sovereignty is a less contested concept. Sovereignty denotes the supreme authority and independence of a state within its defined borders, allowing it to govern itself, make decisions, and control its internal and external affairs without interference from external actors. Sovereignty forms the bedrock of the state and international relations. This principle gives states their legitimate supreme legal and political authority. Sovereignty can be classified into internal sovereignty and external sovereignty. Internal sovereignty refers to the supreme power of a state to control and manage affairs within its borders. External sovereignty is the ability of states to conduct external or international affairs without the intervention of other states.
States may join alliances to help protect their sovereignty by way of deterrence. This can be seen in the case of NATO member states where an attack against any one state is seen as an attack against all. On the other hand, actions to the state by state or non-state actors such as transnational crime or occupation undermines state sovereignty and can disrupt the security of the state.
There is an overlapping or interdependence between security and sovereignty. On the one hand, security is essential for sovereignty. Without security, a state's sovereignty is jeopardized. Threats to a state's security, be it through external aggression or internal unrest, can undermine its ability to govern effectively and maintain control over its territory and population. A state that cannot adequately protect itself and its citizens risks losing its sovereignty, as it may become vulnerable to external influence, coercion, or even external occupation. On the other hand, sovereignty is essential for Security. Sovereignty can be seen as a prerequisite for a state to effectively secure itself. A sovereign state has the authority and capacity to formulate and implement security policies, deploy military forces, enter into security agreements, and establish defense mechanisms to protect its interests and citizens. A state with a high degree of sovereignty can determine its security priorities, alliances, and strategies to respond to various threats, ensuring its overall security and well-being. This overlap of security and sovereignty leads us to the tradeoff between security and sovereignty(autonomy) based on Morrow’s security-autonomy trade-off model.
Morrow’s security-autonomy tradeoff model offers a perspective to analyze the coordination between Jamaica and the United States under the Shiprider Agreement. Morrow’s model is applied to alliances, but it can also be used to analyze security cooperation between allies. The asymmetry between states is also important in analyzing the trade-off between security and autonomy. Cooperation between states is often asymmetric where one states has more economic, political, and military power and uses this power mix to influence the weaker state to behave in a certain manner. In this case of asymmetric cooperation, the strong state or states provide a more or less one-sided support for the partner in a relationship at the expense of the weaker power’s autonomy. In this case, the Morrow’s security-autonomy tradeoff model can be applied to the Shiprider Agreement as the minor state gets security benefits from their partner at the expense of their autonomy while the strong state partner receives the autonomy benefit from the weak state at the expense of providing security.
The dilemma that a country like Jamaica has does not relate to the risk of entrapment in a conflict or the risk of abandonment in a conflict but it relates to the economic or political pressure that the US can exert on the island. That is, the stronger state may force the weaker state to follow certain policies.
Case of the Shiprider Agreement
The Shiprider Agreement, initiated in response to drug trafficking threats, faced initial resistance from Jamaica due to concerns about sovereignty violations. The US, leveraging its economic influence, compelled Jamaica to reconsider. The consequent amendments to the draft addressed issues of sovereignty but it was marked a compromise that increased security for Jamaica but diminished its autonomy.
Unlike other Caribbean states, Jamaica refused to sign the original draft of the agreement on the due to the lack of reciprocity and the violation of Jamaica’s sovereignty in agreement. The US seemed willing to compel Jamaica to ratify the agreement and Jamaica was determined to not ratify the treaty unless the issues of reciprocity and sovereignty were addressed[vii]. Prime Minister Patterson with his legal experience as Queen’s Council was adamant that he would not ratify the treaty and conveyed to Jamaicans that the treaty would violate Jamaican sovereignty.
Jamaica cited three areas of concern that violated their soverignty. First, in US draft of the agreement, US officials would be granted unrestricted authority to search or seize a suspected vessel within the territorial waters of Jamaica, irrespective of the presence of a Jamaican law enforcement official. Secondly, the US draft proposal granted substantial privileges to the US within Jamaica's waters on a non-reciprocal basis. Therefore, not granting Jamaica these priviliges in US maritime waters. Finally, the termination clause of the agreement presented as a problem as the proposed one-year duration in the US draft appeared excessively lengthy to the Jamaican delegation. In light of these concerns Jamaica refused the US draft of the treaty. However, the US with its asymmetric power threatened Jamaica using economic pressure. The US threatened to decertify Jamaica according to the US Foreign Assistant Act. This meant that foreign assistance to Jamaica would be limited which would significantly affect Jamaica’s economy.
The issues were solved by proposals from Jamaica. First, Jamaica’s draft sought to establish a transparent bilateral communication channel where US officials were required to obtain permission from Jamaican authorities before conducting searches on Jamaican or foreign vessels within Jamaica's territorial waters when a Jamaican ‘shiprider’ was not present. The second issue was solved by allowing Jamaican officials the same rights in US waters. This allowed the reciprocal search and seizure of vessels in the other countries waters upon permission from the Ministry of National Security (Jamaica) or the Department of State (US). However, given the asymmetry of resources between Jamaica and the US, Jamaica is unlikely to use this provision.[viii] Finally, Jamaica proposed a termination period of three months.
In the case of the Shiprider Agreement, Jamaica gets security support from the US, but in return, Jamaica loses some of its autonomy. Therefore, the wins and losses of each party will be examined.
Normally, in symmetrical alliances, the autonomy of both states may be decreased but since the US is more powerful than Jamaica then US autonomy is not affected and since Jamaica is not a conflict-prone state, there is not risk of entrapment for the US. Therefore, the US seems to enjoy the wins without any loses as their security is increase and they now have influence over Jamaica’s foreign policy by way of their asymmetric power in this agreement. Jamaica has increased its security while sacrificing some autonomy. Despite this, Jamaica's decision to challenge clauses violating its sovereignty showcases a commendable effort to balance security gains and autonomy losses.
Conclusion
Even though Jamaica lost some of its political sovereignty over how it may want to conduct foreign policy, it gained a significant increase in its security. With or without this agreement, Jamaica would still be motivated to follow Washington’s lead in foreign policy due to the political and economic relations with them. The delicate equilibrium achieved reflects a pragmatic approach that safeguards Jamaica's sovereignty while contributing to global security efforts. Therefore, the increase in security is beneficial compared to the decrease in autonomy. Recently, the Jamaican government is in bilateral negotiations with the US to amend the Shiprider agreement. It would be interesting to see how Jamaica will once again balance the security of its territory with that of its autonomy.
By Jevon 'Jaewon' Dixon
*** The views expressed herein belong solely to the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions of JTMS or Yonsei Institute for North Korean Studies. ***
[i] Suzette Haughton, “Bilateral Diplomacy: Rethinking the Jamaica-US Shiprider Agreement,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 3, no. 3 (2008): 253–76, https://doi.org/10.1163/187119108X367189.
[ii] Jacob Bright, “Operation Buccaneer: Details of D.E.A. Involvement in Jamaica’s 1974 Anti-Narcotics Programme” (URSS Showcase, 2022), https://urss.warwick.ac.uk/items/show/228; Haughton, “Bilateral Diplomacy.”
[iii] Barry Buzan, People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2. ed, ECPR Classics (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2007).
[iv] Elke Krahmann, “Security: Collective Good or Commodity?,” European Journal of International Relations 14, no. 3 (September 2008): 379–404, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066108092304.
[v] Krahmann.
[vi] Krahmann.
[vii] Haughton, “Bilateral Diplomacy.”
[viii] Stephen Vasciannie, “Political And Policy Aspects Of The Jamaica/United States Shiprider Negotiations,” Caribbean Quarterly 43, no. 3 (September 1997): 34–53, https://doi.org/10.1080/00086495.1997.11672100.
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